(A Bit Detailed) Study Guide for Phil259 Midterm

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Dear Students,

Here's the study guide which I promised to write. First, I intended to write a short summary for each view, but it turned out a bit longer than I thought. Hope that its length won't hinder the understanding.


As a general advice, try to pay attention to the following points when you read the texts: What do you think about it? (critical reading) and What relation do the views have to each other? (syntopical reading).

In order to facilitate the syntopical reading, I drew a diagram which shows the inter-relationship between the views. (See the next page.) In drawing the diagram, I neither tried to be complete nor explained why this and that views are considered similar (or different). Those are your job; try to make it as complete as possible and write down in what aspect(s) the views are considered similar (or different). (Note that it's quite possible that two views are similar in one aspect but different in the other.)

There's the diagram without lines on page 3. You can use it for the review. I strongly recommend you connect the views (perhaps using different colors) and write down memos for yourself.

Well, that's all I have to say. Good Luck!

Teppei



Socrates

de Beauvoir Alcibiades Nietzsche Ovid Schopenhauer Augustine

HegelAbelard

Milton

Héloïse

1 Realism and Idealism

First, let's take a look at what Singer says about this distinction.

[T]he [idealist] concept of love became attached to religious and metaphysical doctrines that sought to penetrate nature's secret mysteries. The realist response took the form of critical disbelief, encouraging reliance upon the verities of sensory experience. [...] [L]ove was to be analyzed in terms of what man could learn about himself through empirical observation.¹

In summary:

Idealism The idealist theory transcends the sensible and physical. (Thus, it cannot be reduced to scientific knowledge.)

Realism The realist theory is based on our sensory experiences or empirical observations.² (Thus, it can be reduced to scientific knowledge.)

For example, the Forms are by definition beyond our sensible realm; we can neither see, touch, hear, smell, nor taste them. Thus, according to the above distinction, Scorates/Diotima's view of love is idealist because its main ingredients (namely the Forms) transcend the sensible and physical world. On the other hand, Alcibiades'view of love is realist because what he tells us is based on his own experience.

How about Aristophanes' view? At first blush, his view seems totally unsupportable. We were originally sphere-like shaped creatures with four hands and four legs? C'mon. However, we might just have hadn't found some scientific (archaeological, for that matter) evidences. There is still a (presumably very slim) chance for such evidences to be found in the future.

¹Solomon and Higgins 1991, p. 261

²Be careful about what "being based on experiences" means. Obviously, your own experience alone doesn't constitute a theory. It has to be shown that the experience you have can be shared by others; that is, it has to be repeatable under the right conditions.

In this regard, Aristophanes' view can be considered realist as well.³ On the other hand, there seems to be some idealist assumption in Aristophanes' view; he seems to assume that the separation of the bodies has triggered the desire to be united. However, there is no apparent connection between action (the separation) and intention (the desire). (For example, paramecia don't seem to have any desire to be united after fission.) There has to be some bridge(s) between them.⁶ In this regard, Aristophanes can be said to simply assume this idealist assertion because we have neither any hard evidence of the existence of such bridges nor any decisive philosophical arguments for it so far.

As you might have noticed by now, an argument concerning the idealist/realist distinction can be quite tedious. But, obviously, you don't need to write a lengthy and complicated answer in order to get good marks. Just follow the following procedure:

- 1. In order to argue that a view is idealist, try to show that it can be neither verifiable nor refutable on experimental/experiential grounds.⁷
 - Or simply try to show that a view contains metaphysical/normative elements.
- 2. In order to argue that a view is realist, try to show that it can be either verifiable or refutable on experimental/experiential grounds.
 - Or simply try to show that a view is scientific.

³However, we must be a bit careful about the applicability of this kind of reasoning; if we allowed ourselves the unlimited applicability of the reasoning, almost all views could be considered realist. For example, some day in the future, we might be able to confirm the existence of the Forms by some, say, fancy quantum-theoretical methods which we haven't discovered yet. Thus, in applying this reasoning, we might want to take its plausibility into account. (We actually have some archaeological methods which can be used to find the evidences of the existence of the Aristophanic original creatures while we have no slightest idea what kind of methods (quantum-theoretical or whatever) can be useful in confirming the existence of the Forms.)⁴

⁴By the way, you can always ignore this kind of tedious footnotes.⁵

⁵And don't use the nested footnotes in any serious writings.

 $^{^6}$ For example, you might be able to appeal to some neurophysiological models for the existence of such bridges.

⁷Again, experiments/experiences which verify or refute a view/theory have to be reproducible under the appropriate circumstances.

3. In order to argue that a view can be seen as both idealist and realist ... I guess you already know what to do.

Like I said in the tutorials, this question is pretty much open-ended. There's no clear-cut answer to this. As long as your accounts are persuasive enough and captures the characteristics of the views you're considering, you'll get good marks.

2 Love and Marriage

(In this and following sections, I'll put the quotes mainly in the footnotes. So, even though you've decided to ignore the footnotes in the last section, please take a look at them in this and following sections.)

(And if you don't want to go through every details, just skim Sections 1–4 and read (comparatively deliberately) Section 5 "Summary".)

2.1 Abelard and Héloïse

Abelard and Héloïse seem to share their views about love and marriage. However, while Héloïse is very open about her view, Abelard seems to hide his real intention. Thus, let's focus our attention mainly on Héloïse.

First of all, marriage for Héloïse is nothing but a matter of institution; it is for the economical/political purposes. Thus, there is no *inherent* connection between love and marriage; marriage doesn't need love. Of course, there can be love in marriage but only incidentally so. Then, what does Héloïse think about love? Her version of love is quite passionate, free, and secret. Such love is, according to Héloïse, most likely found outside marriage. As such, it has to be hidden from the lovers' husband or wife, and in turn, this concealment excites their love more.

⁸See the footnote 4 on the previous page.

⁹'It is not love, but the desire of riches and honour which makes women run into the embraces of an indolent husband. Ambition, not affection, forms such marriages" (Solomon and Higgins 1991, p. 52).

¹⁰"I can never think that this is the way to enjoy the pleasures of an affectionate union, nor to feel those secret and charming emotions of hearts that have long strove to be united"; "If there be any thing which may properly be called happiness here below, I am persuaded it is in the union of two persons who love each other with perfect liberty, who are united by a secret inclination" (ibid., p. 52).

On the other hand, Abelard seems to think about marriage mostly in a positive way. He writes in his letter:

A happy exchange of marriage ties for you, then—the wife, first, of the least of men, now raised to wedlock with the greatest of all kings. As a consequence of this honor, you have been lifted not only above the man who was once your husband but above all the other servants of that King.¹¹

But God himself prepared this means to bring us both to him; for if you had not already been bound to me in marriage, you easily would have clung to the world after I had withdrawn from it, succumbing to the pressures of your family or yielding to the pleasures of the flesh.¹²

It's unclear if Abelard really means them, and moreover, he doesn't talk much about what role *erotic* love (i.e., a kind of love Abelard and Héloïse have for each other) plays in marriage. However, one thing is for sure: He still loved her, perhaps throughout his life. ¹³

2.2 Milton

Among the four on the list, Milton is the only person who praises marriage almost indiscriminately.¹⁴ First, he views love as the desire for "a fit conversing soul" ¹⁵¹⁶ and he asserts that we need it in marriage in order to enjoy the

¹¹Abelard and Héloïse 2007, p. 85.

¹²ibid., p. 97.

¹³"I had wished to find in philosophy and religion a remedy for my disgrace; I searched out an asylum to secure me from love. I was come to the sad experiment of making vows to harden my heart. But what have I gained by this? If my passion has been put under a restraint, my ideas yet remain. I promise myself that I will forget you, and yet cannot think of it without loving you; and am pleased with that thought." (Solomon and Higgins 1991, p. 54).

¹⁴As we will see next, Nietzsche also admits the importance and benefits of marriage in human life although our textbook almost exclusively focus on his negative views on marriage.

¹⁵ This pure and more inbred desire of joyning to it selfe in conjugal fellowship a fit conversing soul (which desire is properly call'd love) is stronger then death" (Solomon and Higgins 1991, p. 83); italics in the original.

¹⁶The expression "fit conversing soul" seems to suggest the equality between husband and wife. To some degree, this is actually correct. In her article "Milton and the Sexes", Diane

main benefits of marriage, namely, solace and peace.¹⁷ This kind of love is more important in marriage.¹⁸ Thus, if the minds of the couple doesn't fit well, Milton argues, the couple should consider divorce because they cannot enjoy solace and peace without "a cheerfull and agreeable conversation" between the minds.²⁰

2.3 Nietzsche

Let's start with Nietzsche's view of love.²¹ According to Nietzsche, man and woman understand love differently; while woman understands love as "complete surrender . . . of soul and body",²² man "wants precisely this love from her".²³ Thus, for man, love is nothing but the desire for possession. This desire "comes to an end every time with the possession".²⁴ Then, man seeks another love. Because of this mechanism, love is pretty much transient. Nietzsche also argues that love doesn't make the same; in order to for the lovers to become the same, a love has to somehow mimic his or her lover but

McColley writes: "Thanks to three centuries of progress toward liberty, which Milton helped to promote, the idea that woman was made for man, or that any segment of the human family is subordinate to any other, has been discredited. Milton himself narrowed the gender gap considerably" (Danielson 1989, p. 151). However, there still remains some sort of "sexist language" in his writings. See McColley's aforementioned article (ibid., pp. 147–166), especially pp. 151–156.

¹⁷"[T]he main benefits of conjugall society, which are solace and peace" (Solomon and Higgins 1991, p. 81).

¹⁸"[In marriage] the solace and satisfaction of the mind is regarded and provided for before the sensitive pleasing of the body" (ibid., p. 81).

¹⁹"[T]he best duty of mariage in a cheerfull and agreeable conversation" (ibid., p. 82).

²⁰You might be able to argue about this point that Milton ignores the "love grows" aspect.

²¹Here, we limit ourselves to the writings in our textbook. If such limitation are removed, there can be found a different Nietzsche who has much more positive views on love and marriage. If you're interested such Nietzsche, I recommend Ruth Abbey's "Odd Bedfellows: Nietzsche and Mill on Marriage" (Abbey 1997) which you can download for free from the library website.

²²Solomon and Higgins 1991, p. 146.

²³ibid., p. 146; italics in the original.

²⁴ibid., p. 147.

how is it possible to mimic someone who tries to mimic you?²⁵²⁶

Now, move on to Nietzsche's view of marriage, and next take a look its relation to love. First, what does Nietzsche think of the purposes/functions of marriage? The answers differs according to which writings we're looking at. For example, in Zarathustra, Nietzsche seems to think that the purpose of marriage is in begetting a higher existence, namely overman (Übermensche).²⁷ On the other hand, in The Twilight of Gods, he takes marriage as a building block of society.²⁸ In either instances, it doesn't seem that love is a necessary element in marriage. In fact, Nietzsche thinks that we cannot found marriage on love.²⁹ Why? First, note that we need stable foundations for an "enduring form of organization" such as society. Thus, marriage itself should be stable. However, as was explained above, love is transient; it is "the accident of feeling, passion, and what is merely momentary." Never, absolutely never, can an institution be founded on an idiosyncrasy". ³¹ Then, on what can marriage be founded? "[I]t can be founded on the sex drive, on the property drive (wife and child as property), on the drive to dominate"³² as in Schopenhauer's view.³³

²⁵Solomon and Higgins 1991, pp. 142–143. This criticism is perhaps directed at Hegel's view. See Section 3.2 of this guide.

²⁶In his middle period's writings, Nietzsche talks about this aspect quite positively: "Only reflect to yourself how various are the feelings, how divided the opinions, even among your closest acquaintances, how even the same opinions are of a quite different rank or intensity in the heads of your friends than they are in yours ... And so, since we can endure ourself, let us also endure other people; and perhaps to each of us there will come the more joyful hour" (Nietzsche 1996, pp. 148–149).

²⁷"Marriage: thus I name the will of two to create the one that is more than those who created it ... Thirst for the creator, an arrow and longing for the overman" (Solomon and Higgins 1991, pp. 147–149).

²⁸⁶Marriage as an institution involves the affirmation of the largest and most enduring form of organization" (ibid., p. 150).

²⁹ibid., p. 150.

³⁰ibid., p. 150.

³¹ibid., p. 150.

³²Danielson 1989, p. 150.

³³It would be helpful to think about these foundations of marriage for the second part of the question: Do you agree or disagree with the view? *Prima facie*, the foundations listed above don't seem stable.

2.4 De Beauvoir

De Beauvoir's view of love and marriage is hugely influenced by Nietzsche. It's not too much to say that her view we see in our textbook is almost entirely identical to Nietzsche's. Let's compare her points one by one with her "master".

Man and woman have different views of love.

Nietzsche "What woman understands by love is clear enough: com-

plete surrender (not merely devotion) of soul and body, without any motive, without any reservation. ... Man, when he loves a woman, wants precisely this love from

her" (Solomon and Higgins 1991, p. 146).

De Beauvoir "The single word love in fact signifies two different things

for man and woman" (and she cites the above passage

of Nietzsche) (ibid., p. 233).

Women think they're inferior to men... but soon find out the truth.

Nietzsche "A

"A woman was secretly in love with a man, raised him high above her, and said a hundred times in the most secret recesses of her heart: "if such a man loved me, it would be something I so little deserve I would have to humble myself in the dust!"... When at last their tongues were loosed and they told one another everything they had kept hidden ... the woman said in a cold voice: "but everything is now clear! neither of us is what we have loved! If you are that which you say, and no more, I have debased myself and loved you in vain; the demon seduced me, as he did you!"" (ibid., p. 142).

De Beauvoir

"[H]abituated to seeing in him a superb being whom she cannot possibly equal, the woman who has not repressed her claim to humanity will dream of transcending her being toward one of these superior beings...[but] it may collapse at the first kiss, or in daily association, or during the wedding night" (ibid., pp. 234–235).

Our relationship, whether it's of love or not, is based on differences.

Nietzsche

"Only reflect to yourself how various are the feelings, how divided the opinions, even among your closest acquaintances, how even the same opinions are of a quite different rank or intensity in the heads of your friends than they are in yours; how manifold are the occasions for misunderstanding, for hostility and rupture. After reflecting on all this you must tell yourself: how uncertain is the ground upon which all our alliances and friendships rest" (Nietzsche 1996, p. 148).

De Beauvoir

"An authentic love should assume the contingence of the other; that is to say, his lacks, his limitations, and his basic gratuitousness. It would not pretend to be a mode of salvation, but a human inter-relation." (Solomon and Higgins 1991, p. 237).

Women fortify their "womanliness" (i.e., their debasement in love).

Nietzsche

"[W]ho loves like a woman becomes thereby a more perfect woman" (ibid., p. 146).

De Beauvoir

"[I]t is agonizing for a woman to assume responsibility for her life. . . . It is man's good fortune . . . to be obliged to take the most arduous roads, but the surest; it is woman's misfortune to be surrounded by almost irresistible temptations; everything incites her to follow the easy slopes; instead of being invited to fight her own way up, she is told that she has only to let herself slide and she will attain paradises of enchantment." (ibid., p. 236)..

Marriage is an institution not founded on love. Marriage itself founds society.

Nietzsche "[O]ne cannot ... found marriage on "love". ... Marriage

as an institution involves the affirmation of the largest and most enduring form of organization [such as soci-

ety]" (Solomon and Higgins 1991, p. 150).

De Beauvoir "Marriages, then, are not generally founded upon love.

...It is implied in the very nature of the institution, the aim of which is to make the economic and sexual union of man and woman serve the interest of society"

(Beauvoir 1974, p. 423).

2.5 Summary

View of Love

Héloïse Passionate, free, secret, and physical; namely, pretty

much Alcibiadic.

Milton Desire for "a fit conversing soul"; agreeable and cheerful

conversation between souls.

Nietzsche For man: Desire for possession.

For woman: Desire for giving of her body and soul with-

out reservation.

In either cases, it's transient.

Love doesn't make the lovers the same.

De Beauvoir Same as Nietzsche.

View of Marriage

Héloïse Honorable but merely institutional (it's just for econom-

ical/political purposes); we cannot expect marriage with

love.

Milton Gives us solace and peace; we enjoy delightful conversa-

tions between souls in marriage.

Nietzsche In Zarathustra (1883): For begetting a higher existence.

In Twilight of the Idols (1888): Foundation for an "en-

during form of organization" (society).

De Beauvoir (Almost) same as Nietzsche's. (You should try to figure

out in what aspects her view differs from Nietzsche's.)

View of Love/Marriage

Héloïse Love is not a necessary element in marriage; it'd better

to seek love elsewhere.

Milton Love is absolutely necessary in marriage; if we cannot

find love in marriage, we should divorce.

Nietzsche Marriage cannot be founded on love because love is tran-

sient; rather, it has to be founded on the sex drive, the

property drive, and the drive to dominate.

De Beauvoir (Almost) same as Nietzsche. (Ditto.)

3 Love as Union

3.1 Aristophanes

I guess you already know very well about Aristophanes' view of love. However, it might be good to think about the following Nussbaum's remark on the view.

[E]ach would have to regard his or her bodily movements as fully expressive of and in harmony with the needs and imaginings of the soul or the "insides," so that intercourse was at the same time an interpenetration of imagination with imagination and spirit with spirit.³⁴

In the above, Nussbaum is talking about what happens after two people have been completely fused with each other. In terms of the physical aspects, the story goes comparatively simple. However, when we're thinking about its spiritual aspects, some problems arise.

If the mind stands to one side, if it asks, even momentarily, "Is this me?" or, "Is everything that I am in this?" or, "Does that person moving around inside my body really know anything about me?", then the welding will be at best a partial welding.³⁵

What would happen to this "me"? Where would my memory go after the fusion? Would my other half's memory become "mine"? What would

³⁴Solomon and Higgins 1991, p. 287.

³⁵ibid., p. 287.

this new "whole" know about "our" past? If my memory remained as "my" memory after the fusion, as Nussbaum pointed out above, such fusion would be partial and incomplete.

What do you think?

3.2 Hegel

Hegel's fragment on love begins with the following description of loss.


[E]ach individual loses more and more of his worth, his pretensions, and his independence. This must happen, because his worth was his share in dominion [over objects]; for a man without the pride of being the center of things the end of his collective whole is supreme, and being, like all other individuals, so small a part of that, he despises himself.³⁶

This "there is no place for me in this world" kind of feeling is brought about by one's independence. Becoming independent, one feels alienation from the world. Somehow, s/he must form a bond with the world in order to feel whole.

To fully appreciate Hegel's theory, we have to start with how identity is formed. For Hegel, there seem three kinds of identity: $na\"{i}ve$, divided, and synthesized. Na\"ive identity can be depicted as the following diagram.




At this stage, my consciousness is directed outward only. I am completely identical to me without knowing I am me. However, I soon realizes something out there; namely, me. Then, my consciousness is directed toward me.




³⁶Hegel 1961, p. 303.

At this stage, I finally know I am me. However, I am divided into me as subject and me as object.³⁷ My identity is lost. I must bring my identity back. In other words, I must synthesize these two me's.



This is nothing but an instance of Hegel's famous (or should I say "infamous"?) dialectic. In a general form, dialectic is diagrammatically depicted as follows.




We meet this type of formation again and again in Hegel's writings (even here).


Now, at the second stage above, what I notice is not just the existence of myself; I must notice that of the other(s). Because of such existence, my identity is somehow determined in terms of the other(s); in other words, my identity is determined by opposition. However, this means the loss of

³⁷Borrowing Rimbaud's expression, this situation might be expressed as "I is me".

independence. I need to bring my independence back without losing my identity again. In order to do that, first I must need to give up myself completely to the other.




By giving up myself completely to the other, my self is now in the other. In other words, by opening up myself completely,³⁸ the other sees me as I really am.³⁹ However, in this instance, I am completely lost in the other. In order for me to be still me, I need to bring back myself somehow.



In this way, I brings back myself. But this self is not the same as before ("self" in the diagram); not even the same as the self in the other's eyes ("self""). I now obtain the new identity, "self"".

Unlike de Beauvoir's case, this process is not one-way; it's reciprocal. The other also opens up her/himself to me, brings back her/himself in my eyes, and obtains the new identity. 40 Finally, the other and me are fused together.




 $^{^{38}\}mathrm{This}$ reminds me of what Nussbaum says as to Alcibiades. See Solomon and Higgins 1991, pp. 301–303.

³⁹Note that the self in the other's eyes is not completely the same as the original self. For this reason, I add the prime (') to the self in the other


⁴⁰Recall Nietzsche's criticism: How can we mimic those who mimic us?

In Hegel's description, this process is called *love* and the resulted *we* is called *family*. Because this *we* shares their identity,⁴¹ there's no dependence anymore.⁴² But this is not the end of story; there are a lot more individuals in the world, and consequently, there would be a lot of oppositions between individuals. In order to overcome these oppositions, do we have to love them all individuals?

Hegel's answer to the above question is no. First, note that each of us is a member of some family. Thus, it wouldn't be not so unreasonable to think of a family as a unit in dialectic as follows.



How is this opposition overcome? To explain it is beyond the scope of this writing.⁴³ So, I present the following without explanation.




The opposition between families is overcome by some kind of community. And of course, there are oppositions between communities which are overcome by *state* (or *province*) which is in turn overcome by *nation*. In a diagram,

 $^{^{41}}$ However, Hegel seems to thinks that one doesn't lose his/her individual identity after the formation of we.

 $^{^{42}}$ There would be an outright objection to this; individuals in we are still mutually dependent. Hegel might have thought that this kind of dependence is canceled out.

⁴³If you really wanna know how, read Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*.



Thanks to this hierarchic structure of the world, we can become free without losing identity and independence. At least, Hegel thinks so. 44

3.3 De Beauvoir

As we have seen above, a female lover thinks that she's an inferior creature to her male lover of whom she thinks almost as a god. In order to overcome this inferior complex, or in order to be complete, she has to become him.⁴⁵

⁴⁴This way of thinking seems so *totalitarian*. As a matter of fact, it is. We exist for all, not the other way around. However, it seems also right that (some of) our rights are guaranteed because of the existence of such structure. In this sense, what Hegel says captures some aspect of our life.

⁴⁵ The supreme goal of human love, as of mystical love, is identification with the loved one. The measure of values, the truth of the world, are in his consciousness; hence it is not enough to serve him. The woman in love tries to see with his eyes; she reads the books he reads, prefers the pictures and the music he prefers" (Solomon and Higgins 1991, p. 236).

She and her male lover have to become "us". 4647

This female's desire to become her male lover obvious means that the female lover has to give up her identity and submit herself to him. However, as we have seen above, soon it turns out that a man is not even a demigod; he is just like her. Then, does she liberate herself and get her identity back? According to de Beauvoir, the story is not going that way. Faced with the harsh reality that her lover is not like what she thinks, first she defends him and demands that he acts like a god; in this way, she deprives him of his liberty.⁴⁸

3.4 Nozick

See Dave's slides.

3.5 Summary

Why union?

Aristophanes To recover completeness/wholeness.

Hegel To overcome the feeling of loss, obtain true identity, and

become free.

De Beauvoir To feel justified. **Nozick** To feel happy.

⁴⁶"The supreme happiness of the woman in love is to be recognized by the loved man as a part of himself; when he says "we," she is associated and identified with him, she shares his prestige and reigns with him over the rest of the world" (Solomon and Higgins 1991, p. 237).

⁴⁷If this desire is a one-way, that is, if the male lover doesn't feel the need for the identification with her (actually this is the case in de Beauvoir's view), there is no "us" in the strict sense. Since she tries to be him and he doesn't try to be her, if the "union" were accomplished completely, what's left would be just "him" although there would still remain two bodies.

⁴⁸"If he gets tired or careless, if he gets hungry or thirsty at the wrong time, if he makes a mistake or contradicts himself, she asserts that he is "not himself" and she makes a grievance of it. In this indirect way she will go so far as to take him to task for any of his ventures that she disapproves; she judges her judge, and she denies him his liberty so that he may deserve to remain her master" (Solomon and Higgins 1991, p. 238).

How is it accomplished?

Aristophanes By becoming one entity, literally. (Partial realization:

sexual intercourse.)

Hegel By giving up oneself completely to the other.

De Beauvoir By becoming the other.

Nozick By taking one's well-being (or misfortune) as one's own.

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